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Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political 
Space: Six European Countries compared 
ABSTRACT∗ 
In this paper, we present the basic ideas, the design and some key results of an ongoing 
research project on the transformation of the national political space in Western Europe. 
We start from the assumption that the current process of globalization or denationaliza-
tion leads to the formation of a new structural conflict in Western European countries, 
opposing those who benefit from this process to those who tend to loose in the course of 
the events. The structural opposition between globalization ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is 
expected to constitute potentials for the political mobilization within national political 
contexts. The political mobilization of these potentials, in turn, is expected to give rise 
to two intimately related dynamics: the transformation of the basic structure of the na-
tional political space and the strategic repositioning of the political parties within the 
transforming space. We present several hypotheses with regard to these two dynamics 
and test them empirically on the basis of newly collected data concerning the supply 
side of electoral politics from six Western European countries (Austria, Britain, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). The results indicate that in all the coun-
tries, the new cleavage has been embedded into the existing two-dimensional national 
political spaces. In the process, the meaning of the original dimensions has been trans-
formed. The configuration of the main parties has become triangular even in a country 
like France where it used to be bipolar. 
                                                 
∗  We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments and critique that have allowed us to im-
prove our argument and to clarify the specificity of our results with regard to those of related research. 
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Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political 
Space: Six European Countries compared 
INTRODUCTION 
The political consequences of globalization are manifold. On the one hand, this process 
leads to the establishment of new forms of political authority and of new channels of 
political representation at the supranational level and opens up new opportunities for 
transnational, international, and supranational mobilization (Della Porta 1999). On the 
other hand, the same processes have profound political implications at the national 
level. National politics are challenged both ‘from above’ – through new forms of inter-
national cooperation and a process of supranational integration – and ‘from below,’ at 
the regional and local level. While the political consequences of globalization have most 
often been studied at the supra- or transnational level (Zürn 1998; Held et al. 1999; 
Greven & Pauly 2000; Hall & Biersteker 2002; Grande & Pauly 2005), we shall focus 
on the effects of globalization on national politics. We assume that, paradoxically, the 
political reactions to economic and cultural globalization are bound to manifest them-
selves above all at the national level: given that the democratic political inclusion of 
citizens is still mainly a national affair, nation-states still constitute the major arenas for 
political mobilization (Zürn et al. 2000). Our study focuses on Western European coun-
tries, where ‘denationalization’ means, first of all, European integration. For the present 
argument, however, this aspect of the European context is not essential. Europeanization 
and European integration can also be seen as special cases of the more general phe-
nomenon globalization (Schmidt 2003). 
Zürn suggests to view the process of globalization as a process of ‘denationalization’ 
(Beisheim et al. 1999; Zürn 1998), i.e. as a process that leads to the lowering and ‘un-
bundling’ of national boundaries (Ruggie 1993). It is true that there are earlier examples 
of globalization, but there is plenty of evidence that this process has accelerated in the 
1980s and 1990s. Following David Held and his collaborators (Held et al. 1999: 425), 
who have probably presented the most detailed and measured account of the phenome-
non in question, we may argue that ‘in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of 
globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have 
also displayed unparalleled qualitative differences – that is in terms of how globaliza-
tion is organized and reproduced.’ If we put this process in a Rokkanean perspective 
(see Rokkan 2000), we may conceive of the contemporary opening up of boundaries as 
a new ‘critical juncture,’ which is likely to result in the formation of new structural 
cleavages, both within and between national contexts. 
This is the starting point of a research project in which we are currently involved. In 
this paper, we shall discuss in more detail our expectations regarding the formation and 
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articulation of new political cleavages and present some first results with respect to the 
supply side of national politics. In the next section, we discuss how the process of dena-
tionalization is expected to lead to the formation of a new conflict, opposing ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ of the process of globalization. This conflict is expected to constitute poten-
tials for processes of political mobilization within national political contexts. We shall 
then examine how these potentials can be articulated at the level of political parties. We 
are well aware that, in order to fully understand how new political cleavages may result 
from the process of denationalization, it is crucial to focus both on the transformations 
in the electorate (the demand side of electoral competition), and on the kind of strategies 
political parties adopt to position themselves with regard to these new potentials (the 
supply side of politics). In this paper, we shall only deal with the processes of transfor-
mation on the supply side. After the elaboration of our hypotheses concerning this kind 
of transformation, we shall present our research design and some key results for the six 
countries covered by our project. 
A NEW STRUCTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN ‘WINNERS AND LOSERS’ OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
Three assumptions guide our analysis:  
¾ First, we consider that the consequences of globalization are not the same for 
all members of a national community. We expect them to give rise to new dis-
parities, new oppositions and new forms of competition.  
¾ Second, we assume that citizens perceive these differences between ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ of globalization, and that these categories are articulated by politi-
cal parties.  
¾ Third, we expect that these new oppositions are not aligned with, but crosscut 
the traditional structural and political cleavages.  
The ‘losers’ of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected 
by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat for 
their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are be-
ing reduced. The ‘winners,’ on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new 
opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced. The 
essential criterion for determining the impact of the opening up of national boundaries 
on individual life chances is whether or not someone possesses exit options. As Zyg-
munt Baumann (1998: 9) has observed, in the age of globalization mobility becomes the 
most powerful factor of social stratification. On the one hand, there are those who are 
mobile, because they control convertible resources allowing them to exit, and on the 
other hand there are those who remain locked-in, because they lack these resources. 
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The scope of the structural changes induced by globalization is still a point of con-
troversy. It is widely debated in political science and in sociology (see for example Al-
brow 1996; Beck 1997, 1998a, 1998b or Goldthorpe 2002). For our purposes, we can 
identify three mechanisms which contribute to the formation of winners and losers of 
globalization. First among these is the increase in economic competition, which results 
from the globalization process. Over the last decades, a series of transformations in the 
American economy have resulted in a massive pressure towards deregulations in West-
ern European countries, leading in turn to a dramatic erosion of protected property 
rights. Schwartz (2001: 44) suggests to interpret the impact of globalization as ‘the ero-
sion of politically based property rights and their streams of income, and as reactions to 
that erosion.’ The individuals and the firms that are most directly affected by this ero-
sion are those who worked in ‘sheltered’ sectors, i.e. sectors that were, since the 1930s, 
protected from market pressures through public regulation.1 Those measures discon-
nected income streams (in the form of wages, employment, or profits) from the outcome 
of the market. In the context of globalization, Schwartz’s distinction between sectors 
sheltered from the market, on the one hand, and sectors exposed to the market, on the 
other, has much in common with the distinction between export-oriented firms and 
firms oriented towards the domestic market.2 With the international pressure towards 
deregulation, the cleavage between these two sectors intensifies. Firms exposed to 
global market pressures try to impose market disciplines on traditionally sheltered sec-
tors, so as to bring down their own costs of production and to remain competitive on the 
international market. Firms in sheltered sectors, by contrast, seek to defend their prop-
erty rights. Workers in exposed sectors also have an interest in the lowering of produc-
tion costs, as their jobs directly depend on the international competitiveness of their 
firm. Workers in sheltered sectors, by contrast, have the same interest in protectionist 
                                                 
1  Such measures include: ‘trade protection, minimum wages, centralized collective bargaining, product market 
regulation, zoning, the delegated control over markets to producer groups, and […] formal welfare states’ 
(Schwartz 2001: 31). 
2  Schwartz emphasizes however the difference between the two classifications. Considering them as equivalent is 
misleading, he argues, because few commodities or services are not subject to international trade. Furthermore, 
he considers the stranded investments of the ‘sheltered’ sectors to be a central problem, which is different from 
the issue of the opportunity costs of the export-oriented sectors. For a similar argument, see Frieden (1991: 440): 
‘The principal beneficiaries of the broad economic trends of the last two decades have been internationally ori-
ented firms and the financial services industries; the principal losers have been nationally based industrial firms’; 
and Frieden and Rogowski (1996: 46): ‘... exogenous easing of trade will be associated with increased demands 
for liberalization from the relatively competitive, and with increased demands of protection from the relatively 
uncompetitive, groups.’ 
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measures as their employers. Globalization thus leads to a sectoral cleavage, which cuts 
across the traditional class cleavage and tends to give rise to cross-class coalitions. 
As a result of globalization, the increasing economic competition is, however, not 
only defined in sectoral, but also in ethnic terms – ethnic taken here in a large sense 
(including language and religious criteria). This is a consequence of the massive immi-
gration into Western Europe of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European 
population on the one hand, and of the increasing opportunities for delocalizing jobs 
into distant, and ethnically distinct regions of the globe, on the other hand. Thus, the 
increasing economic competition is linked to a second mechanism – an increasing cul-
tural diversity (Albrow 2001). In the immigration countries, then, ethnically different 
populations become symbols of potential threats to the collective identity and to the 
standard of living of the natives, resulting in cultural competition. Furthermore, the 
European welfare states have been granting some of their social rights and privileges – 
though no political rights – to the migrants (Soysal 1994: 130), which increases the per-
ception of competition (for the same scarce resources) on the part of the native popula-
tion. However, this potential economic and cultural threat may not necessarily be per-
ceived and experienced in the same way by all members of a national community. In 
this respect, the individual level of education plays a key role. Education has a ‘liberal-
ising’ effect, i.e. it induces a general shift in political value orientations toward cultural 
liberalism (cosmopolitanism, universalism). It contributes to cultural tolerance and 
openness; it provides the language skills which give access to other cultures. Individuals 
who are poorly educated are usually less tolerant and do not have the resources to com-
municate with foreigners or to understand other cultures in a more general sense (Lipset 
1963; Grunberg & Schweisguth 1990: 54, 1997a: 155-59, 168; Quillian 1995; Snider-
man et al. 2000: 84). Finally, higher education has also become an indispensable asset 
for one’s professional success. It provides the necessary specialized skills which are 
marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing one’s 
exit options. It is certainly true that this development is less a consequence of globaliza-
tion than of the process of deindustrialization and of technological change. But from the 
point of view of the affected groups, it is central to understand how they perceive their 
relative loss in life chances and to whom they attribute its causes. 
A third mechanism related to the opening up of borders increases the political com-
petition between nation-states, on the one hand, and supra- or international political ac-
tors, on the other. Most scholars agree, that as a consequence of globalization nation-
states have lost part of their problem solving capacity. For example, the possibilities for 
an independent macro-economic policy have been drastically reduced because of the 
liberalization of the financial markets. This is obvious in the European context, where 
an autonomous monetary policy has no longer been possible since the creation of a 
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European central bank. These changes create winners and losers in specific ways, too. 
First of all, there may be material losers to the extent that the reduction of a state’s 
autonomy may imply a reduction of the size of the public sector. But, more importantly, 
winners and losers also result from differences in their identification with the national 
community. Gorenburg (2000) has emphasized the importance of such identifications to 
understand support for nationalism. Individuals who possess a strong identification with 
their national community and who are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a 
weakening of the national political institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with uni-
versalist norms will perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of 
supranational political institutions.3 The attachment to national traditions, national lan-
guages, and religious values plays a prominent role here – as does the integration into 
transnational networks.4 
To sum up, the likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified 
employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citi-
zens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employ-
ees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who 
strongly identify themselves with their national community. Following the realistic the-
ory of group conflict, we consider that the threats perceived by the losers and their re-
lated attitudes do have a real basis. They are not simply illusions or rest on false con-
sciousness. However, we assume that individuals do not perceive cultural and material 
threats as distinct phenomena5. As Martin Kohli (2000: 118) argues, identity and inter-
ests are mutually reinforcing factors of social integration. 
The new groups of winners and losers of globalization constitute political potentials, 
which can be articulated by political organizations. However, given the heterogeneous 
composition of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function 
of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions on which 
domestic politics have traditionally been based. This makes it difficult for established 
national political actors to organize these new potentials. In addition, the composition of 
the groups of winners and losers varies between national contexts, making it even more 
                                                 
3  For the distinction between norms of exclusion and universalist norms, see Hardin (1995: chapters 4 and follow-
ing). 
4  Traditionally, integration into cosmopolitan networks was the preserve of a small elite. Today, however, the Jet 
Set is not the only group which is forming transnationally and which is developing identities that rival with terri-
torially more circumscribed identities (Badie 1997: 453f.). 
5  Bobo (1999: 457): ‘… the melding of group identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of 
racial stratification make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of ‘realistic group conflict versus preju-
dice’ empirically nonsensical.’ 
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difficult to organize them at the supranational level, e.g. at the level of the European 
Union. This heterogeneity results in a twofold problem for the organization and articula-
tion of political interests. First of all, it creates the already mentioned political paradox 
of globalization: due to their heterogeneity, the new political potentials created by this 
process are most likely to be articulated and dealt with at the level of the national politi-
cal process. Moreover, it opens a ‘window of opportunity’ for the formation of new po-
litical parties and the restructuring of the national party systems. 
We thus suggest that, paradoxically, the lowering and unbundling of national 
boundaries render them more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, their politi-
cal importance increases. More specifically, the destructuring of national boundaries 
leads to a ‘sectorialization’ and an ‘ethnicization’ of politics (Badie 1997), i.e. to an 
increased salience of differences between sectors of the economy and of cultural differ-
ences, respectively, as criteria for the distribution of resources, identity formation, and 
political mobilization. As far as the ethnicization of politics is concerned, the theory of 
ethnic competition holds that majority groups will react to the rise of new threats with 
exclusionary measures (Olzak 1992). At a general level, we would expect losers of the 
globalization process to seek to protect themselves through protectionist measures and 
through an emphasis on national independence. Winners, by contrast, who benefit from 
the increased competition, should support the opening up of the national boundaries and 
the process of international integration. We shall refer here to this antagonism between 
winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between integration and demarcation.6 
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL CONFLICT ON THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE POLITICAL SPACE 
These arguments and hypotheses present a general framework for understanding recent 
developments in the structure of political competition and in electoral alignments in 
Western democracies. They set a research agenda of which we can empirically analyze 
here only some aspects. In the following sections, we shall focus on the political articu-
lation of the integration-demarcation cleavage by political parties and formulate a series 
of hypotheses. To this end, we first need to clarify two interdependent aspects of the 
same phenomenon: the transformation of the basic structure of the political space and 
the positioning of the parties within this space. These two dynamics are linked to each 
other, given that, on the one hand, the issues which structure the space are articulated by 
the individual parties, and that, on the other hand, individual parties are positioning 
themselves strategically with regard to the structural potentials available for political 
articulation. As a consequence of strategies used in electoral competition, and partially 
as a reaction to social change, parties change their positions within a space, whose di-
                                                 
6  Bartolini (2000) refers to it as a conflict between integration and independence. 
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mensions may change as well7. It is only for expository purposes that we separate the 
two sides of the same coin.  
As far as the transformation of the basic structure is concerned, it is first of all useful 
to specify the new structural conflict according to the aspects concerned: we should 
distinguish between an economic dimension and a cultural dimension of the integra-
tion/demarcation divide8. With respect to both dimensions, we can distinguish between 
an open, integrationist position, and a defensive, protectionist one. In the economic do-
main, a neoliberal free trade position is opposed to a position in favour of protecting the 
national markets. In the cultural domain, a universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan 
position is opposing a position in favour of protecting the national culture and citizen-
ship in its civic, political, and social sense. The orientations on the two dimensions need 
not necessarily coincide. One could also further specify the notion of integration by dis-
tinguishing between the removal of boundaries and other obstacles to free and undis-
torted international competition – purely negative integration in Scharpf’s (1999: 45) 
terminology – and a process of reconstruction of a system of regulation at the suprana-
tional or international level – a process that Scharpf calls positive integration.  
Next, we should discuss how the two dimensions of the presumed new structural 
conflict are expected to relate to the existing structure of cleavages in Western European 
politics. According to Rokkan (2000), four classic cleavages have structured the Euro-
pean political space – the center/periphery, religious, rural/urban, and owner/worker 
cleavages. This set essentially boils down to two dimensions: a cultural (religion) and a 
social-economic one (class) (Kriesi 1994: 230-234). Class conflicts were omnipresent in 
Western Europe and structured politics around social-economic policy – the regulation 
of the market and the construction of social protection by the state. The left essentially 
fought for social protection and market regulation, while the right defended the free 
reign of market forces. Religious conflicts prevailed between Catholics and Protestants 
in religiously mixed countries, and between the believing Catholics and the secularized 
in Catholic countries. In the Protestant North-West, Protestant dissidents contributed to 
religious conflicts. After World War II, these traditional cleavages have lost much of 
their traditional structuring capacity for politics as a result of secularization, value 
change, rising levels of education, improved standards of living, and sectoral change 
(tertiarization) (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Inglehart 1990; Kriesi 1993). In 
their place, new structuring conflicts have developed since the late sixties, which have 
                                                 
7  Van der Brug (1999: 151, 2001: 119f.) has already pointed out the interdependence between these two dynamics. 
8  Our distinction of these two aspects of the purported new conflict follows Lipset (1963), who used to distinguish 
between socio-economic and cultural conservatism and liberalism respectively (see also Middendorp 1978; 
Grunberg & Schweisguth 1990). 
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been variously labeled as expressions of a ‘new politics’ (Franklin 1992; Müller-
Rommel 1984, 1985, 1990), a ‘new value’ (Inglehart 1977, 1985, 1990, 1997) or ‘new 
class’ (Evans 1999; Kriesi 1998; Manza & Brooks 1999; Lachat 2004; Oesch 2004) 
cleavage. The ‘cultural revolution’ of the late sixties gave birth to a series of so called 
‘new social movements’ which mobilized in the name of universalist values – human 
rights, emancipation of women, solidarity with the poor of the world, protection of the 
environment. Their vision was one of cultural liberalism and social justice/protection. 
These were essentially movements of the left, which often found close allies in the es-
tablished parties of the left and, in due course, spawned a new set of parties – the New 
Left and Green parties. Their concerns reinvigorated the traditional class cleavage and 
reinforced the left’s position on the social-economic dimension. In addition, they con-
tributed to the transformation of the cultural dimension from a dimension mainly de-
fined in terms of religious concerns to one opposing culturally liberal or libertarian con-
cerns, on the one side, and the defence of traditional (authoritarian) values and institu-
tions (including traditional Christian religion, traditional forms of the family, and a 
strong army), on the other. Kitschelt (1994, 1995) has perhaps most forcefully concep-
tualized the effect of this transformation on the structuration of the political space.  
It is crucial that the mobilization of the new social movements did not add any fun-
damentally new dimension to the political space, but transformed the meaning of the 
two already existing ones. The political space remained two-dimensional, defined by a 
social-economic and a cultural dimension. What changed was the meaning of the con-
flicts associated with these two dimensions. In a similar vein, we can now hypothesize 
that the new demarcation/integration conflict will be embedded into the two-
dimensional basic structure that emerged under the impact of the mobilization by the 
new social movements, transforming it once again. This is our embedding hypothesis. 
On the social-economic dimension, the new conflict can be expected to reinforce the 
classic opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position while giving it a new 
meaning. The pro-state position is likely to become more defensive and more protec-
tionist, while the pro-market position is likely to become more assertive in favor of the 
enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets. At the same time, the in-
creasing sectoralization of concerns may drive a wedge between former allies on the 
pro-market side. On the cultural dimension, we expect enhanced opposition to the cul-
tural liberalism of the new social movements as a result of the ethnicization of politics: 
the defense of tradition is expected to increasingly take on an ethnic or nationalist char-
acter. Furthermore, new issues should be integrated into the cultural dimension. Central 
among these are the issues of European integration and of immigration, which corre-
spond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization. 
The demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterised by an oppo-
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sition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to 
immigration. 
Instead of the new conflict becoming embedded into the already existing conflict di-
mensions, one might, alternatively, expect it to transform the national political space by 
adding one or even two new dimensions to the two already existing ones. The main rea-
son, why we do not think that this is going to happen has to do with the adaptive capac-
ity of the already existing parties. The mainstream parties take up the new preferences, 
identities, values and interests, and interpret and articulate them in their own specific 
ways (Schattschneider 1960; Mair 1983, 1993: 130; Laver 1989). We suggest that es-
tablished parties are repositioning and realigning themselves as a result of the rising 
new conflict. Accordingly, the increasing volatility in the Western European elections 
cannot only be interpreted, as is usually done, as the result of increasing issue-voting on 
the part of the electorate, but also as a result of this repositioning and realigning of es-
tablished parties. 
THE POSITIONING OF THE PARTIES WITHIN THE TRANSFORMED SPACE 
Assuming the validity of our embedding hypothesis, we can now discuss our hypotheses 
regarding the positions taken by political parties in this transformed political space. The 
different combinations of positions on the two dimensions represent the range of possi-
ble interpretative packages or ideological master-frames which are available to political 
entrepreneurs for the articulation of the new structural antagonism in the context of al-
ready existing political divisions. Figure 1 offers a schematic representation of the ex-
pected positions of the major groups of parties: we distinguish between three traditional 
party families of which we find representatives in all Western European countries – the 
social-democrats, the liberals and the conservatives (often represented by Christian-
democrats) – as well as two groups of more recent competitors: the New Left and green 
parties, on the one hand, and the populist right, on the other. This figure presents a map 
of the parties’ possible positions, which we discuss in more detail in the following para-
graphs. The exact locations of parties in different countries are likely to vary, as they 
depend not only on the common trends linked with globalization, but also on the par-
ties’ strategic decisions and on specific contextual factors (which we shall not discuss 
here). This figure can be considered as a general summary of our hypotheses regarding 
the transformed structure of the political space and parties’ positions within this space. 
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Figure 1: Expected positioning of party families with respect to the new cleavage 
 
Demarcation           Economic dimension          Integration 
Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Cultural 
dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demarcation 
 
 
 
  New Left /       Liberal- 
    Greens      Radicals 
            Third Way 
 
       Social democrats   Liberals 
 
  Classical Left        Christian    Liberal- 
        democrats  Conserv. 
 
    Conservatives 
 
 
 
        Populist      New Radical 
            right      Right 
  
Typically mainstream political parties have so far taken a rather undifferentiated posi-
tion with respect to the new cleavage. They seem to be uncertain about it, because (a) 
they are internally divided with regard to the question of integration, (b) they are di-
vided as Euro-families as a result of their variable insertion into national party configu-
rations, and (c) they are not in a position to form a strong alliance between different 
sectoral and cultural interests. Broadly speaking, whether on the left or on the right, they 
tend to view the process of economic denationalization both as inevitable and beneficial 
for the maintenance of their established positions. Thus, analyzing the main party fami-
lies – the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats – at the EU level, Hix (1999) has 
noted that, between 1976 and 1994, all three gradually converged on moderately pro-
Integration positions. The findings of Hooghe et al. (2002) and van der Eijk and Frank-
lin (2004) about the general preference regarding European integration of mainstream 
parties support this point. As a first hypothesis, we would suggest that, in Western 
Europe, (a) mainstream parties will generally tend to formulate a winners’ programme, 
i.e. a programme in favour of further economic and cultural integration, but that (b) 
mainstream parties on the left will attempt to combine the economic integration with the 
preservation of the social protection by the welfare state, while mainstream parties on 
the right will tend to reduce the role of the state in every respect.  
There are, however, variations of this general theme. On the left, mainstream parties 
face the dilemma that market integration in Europe (and more globally) poses a threat to 
their national social achievements. Depending on their capacity to defend these 
achievements at the national level, mainstream left parties may vary with regard to the 
extent to which they endorse economic integration (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe 
and Marks 2001). Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary mostly along the eco-
nomic dimension of the political space. We may distinguish between a ‘classical left’ 
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position that sticks to the statist attitude and the position of the Third Way, formulated 
by the British Labour Party and later also discussed in other countries – especially in 
Germany, which constitutes a novel attempt to come to terms with the problems posed 
by the new dividing line: Third Way politics takes globalization seriously, adopts a 
positive attitude towards it, and seeks to combine a neoliberal endorsement of free trade 
with a core concern with social justice (Giddens 1998: 64ff.). For the architects of the 
Third Way, taking globalization seriously also requires steps in the direction of ‘positive 
integration,’ in the form of global economic governance, global ecological management, 
regulation of corporate power, control of warfare and fostering of transnational democ-
racy (Giddens 2000: 122-162). In the transformed political space, compared to the loca-
tion of the traditional left, parties of the Third Way should be more favourable to further 
integration, on both the economic and cultural dimensions. 
On the right, conservatives also face a dilemma – a dilemma that is precisely the op-
posite of the one faced by mainstream parties of the left (Marks and Wilson 2000; 
Hooghe and Marks 2001): economically they tend to endorse liberalization, but socially 
and culturally they tend to be nationalists and opposed to the opening up of the borders. 
Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary especially along the cultural dimension. 
Depending on the threat posed by integration to the national identity, the conservatives 
will be more or less opposed to integration. Given the British fear of losing the national 
identity and culture, a fear that is largely absent in countries such as Germany or Spain 
(Diez Medrano 2004), it is, for example, not surprising that the British Conservatives 
are much more eurosceptic than the German or Spanish ones.9 Compared to the other 
two main political families, at first sight the opening up of the borders seems to consti-
tute less of a challenge for the liberal family. Classical liberalism was both economi-
cally and socio-culturally liberal, i.e. supported the free market and social and cultural 
openness and tolerance. At closer inspection, however, we can find that European liber-
alism has been characterized by a strong ambivalence regarding the left-right dimen-
sion. As a consequence, we can distinguish various variants within the liberal party fam-
ily (Smith 1988). Most important is the distinction between ‘liberal-radicalism’ and 
‘liberal conservatism.’ Whereas the former (e.g. the Dutch D66) have been left-of-
centre on economic issues, the latter (e.g. the Dutch VVD) have been emphasizing eco-
nomic freedom and market liberalization and tended to be right-of-centre. Faced with 
the opening of the borders, liberal-conservatives are distinguished by the fact that they 
                                                 
9  In this context, Christian-democratic parties stand out because they are confronted with both dilemmas at the 
same time. Traditionally, they have been (moderate) supporters of the welfare state and the strongest advocates of 
European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000: 451-454). Hence, in a transformed political space they need to re-
define their position on both dimensions. 
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tend to put the accent on market liberalization, i.e. on the negative integration with re-
spect to the economy, while they oppose supranational political integration (Marks and 
Wilson 2000: 448-450). 
On the basis of these empirical observations, we can expect two possible develop-
ments. The first development is an intensification of political conflicts within main-
stream political parties as a consequence of their attempts to redefine their ideological 
profiles. In some cases, these conflicts have been successfully resolved by transforming 
the party’s profile, Britain’s New Labour and the Austrian FPÖ being two of the most 
significant cases. Mostly, however, the mainstream political parties are still character-
ized by their indecision and their tendency to moderately opt for the winners’ side. For 
these cases, we suggest a second general hypothesis: In countries, in which these parties 
dominate, we face an increasing political fragmentation (Zürn 2001) with the strength-
ening of peripheral political actors, who tend to adopt a ‘losers’ programme.’ Peripheral 
actors on the right are expected to be culturally more protectionist, and peripheral actors 
on the left to be socially and economically more protectionist than their respective 
mainstream counterparts. The positioning of the parties with regard to Europe may 
serve as an illustration of this hypothesis: analyzing the Euroscepticism of political par-
ties in different European countries, Taggart (1998) found that it is the more peripheral 
parties (on both sides of the political spectrum), rather than parties more central to their 
party systems, which are most likely to use Euroscepticism as a mobilizing issue. The 
‘inverted U curve’ characterizing the shape of the relationship between left-right posi-
tion and support for European integration has been confirmed by several studies 
(Hooghe et al. 2002; van der Eijk & Franklin 2004): parties of both the radical left and 
the populist right are most opposed to European integration. Furthermore, Hooghe et al. 
(2002: 977) add the insight that the positioning of a party on the cultural dimension ‘ex-
erts a strong, consistent, and, it must be said, largely overlooked effect on party posi-
tioning on European issues: independently of a party’s positioning on the (social-
economic) left-right dimension, ‘traditional-authoritarian-nationalist’ parties are much 
more likely to be eurosceptical than ‘green-alternative-libertarian’ parties.  
The radical left’s opposition to the opening up of the borders is mainly an opposition 
to economic liberalization and to the threat it poses to the left’s achievement at the na-
tional level. The populist right’s opposition to the opening up of the borders is first of 
all an opposition to the social and cultural forms of competition and the threat they pose 
to national identity. The main characteristics of the populist right are its xenophobia or 
even racism, expressed in a fervent opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western 
Europe, and its populist appeal to the widespread resentment against the mainstream 
parties and the dominant political elites. Right-wing populists are clearly protectionist 
on the cultural dimension. At the same time, it is populist in its instrumentalization of 
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sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment as well as in its appeal to the ‘common man’ 
and his allegedly superior common sense. It builds on the losers’ fears with regard to 
the removal of national borders, and on their strong belief in simple and ready-made 
solutions. This ‘national-populism’ constitutes the common characteristic of all organi-
zations of the Western European populist right. As Betz (2003) observes, its position on 
immigration is increasingly becoming part of a larger programme, which poses a fun-
damental challenge to liberal democracies. He now describes this programme as a 
‘combination of differential nativism and comprehensive protectionism.’ In an earlier 
assessment (Betz 1993), he had still identified neoliberal economic elements in the pro-
grammes of the populist right. Similarly, Kitschelt (1995) had pointed out that not all 
right-wing populist parties shared this element, but had insisted that the most successful 
ones among them did at the time. According to Kitschelt, the combination of cultural 
protectionism and economic neoliberalism constituted the ‘winning formula’ allowing 
these parties to forge electoral coalitions appealing both to their declining middle-class 
clientele and to the losers from the unskilled working class. This position corresponds to 
the lower right region of Figure 1, where it is labeled as New Radical Right. More re-
cently, also Kitschelt (2001: 435) noted that some populist right parties have moderated 
their neoliberal appeals and started to focus more on the themes of a reactive national-
ism and of ethnocentrism.  
We consider those parties that most successfully appeal to the interests and fears of 
the ‘losers’ of globalization to be the driving force of the current transformation of the 
Western European party systems. In most countries, it is these parties of the populist 
right (Decker 2004) who have been able to formulate a highly attractive ideological 
package for the ‘losers’ of economic transformations and cultural diversity. Following 
Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Diez Medrano (2004), who show the key importance of 
fears about national identities for eurosceptic attitudes in the general public, we suggest 
that such fears are generally more important for the mobilization of the ‘losers’ than the 
defense of their economic interests. This could explain why the populist right’s appeal 
to the ‘losers’ is more convincing than that of the radical left. Moreover, the mobiliza-
tion of the ‘losers’ is particularly consequential, because, in contrast to the ‘winners,’ 
the ‘losers’ typically do not have individual exit-options at their disposal. To improve 
their situation, they depend on collective mobilization.  
While the new social movements of the sixties and seventies have above all trans-
formed the left, the mobilization by the populist right constitutes a major challenge for 
the established parties of the right as well as of the left (Kriesi 1999). One of its effects 
is the transformation of established liberal or conservative parties, who adopt the essen-
tial elements of cultural protection of the populist right’s programme in order to appeal 
to the ‘losers’ and essentially become part of the family of the populist right. The Aus-
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trian FPÖ and the Swiss SVP illustrate this point. In both cases, an established party of 
the right radicalized and adopted a programme including strong national-populist ele-
ments. The mutation to a populist party can either be the result of the transformation of 
a formerly liberal-conservative party such as the FPÖ, or of a formerly conservative 
party such as the Swiss SVP.  
We assume that the new conflict creates comparable political potentials in all West-
ern European democracies. The way these potentials are articulated by the parties in a 
given country depends, however, on country-specific factors. For our purposes here, 
these contextual factors are not central since we are mainly interested in the similarities 
of the transformations in the different countries. Given that we consider the right-wing 
populist parties to be the driving force of these transformations, we suggest that one 
should pay special attention to those factors that influence the strength of this particular 
type of party. These factors include national political institutions (electoral systems in 
particular and type of democracy more generally10), the general strategic dynamics of 
the established parties (convergence vs. polarization11), their alliance strategies with 
respect to the populist right in particular (stigmatization vs. cooperation12) and the spe-
cific characteristics of right-wing populist parties themselves (the charisma of their 
leader and their organizational capacity13) as well as the breadth of their appeal, i.e. the 
degree to which the voters perceive them as normal parties, which, in turn, enables them 
to mobilize beyond the core constituency of radical right-wing voters.14 The challenge 
of a successful right-wing populist party is likely to reinforce the relative importance of 
the cultural dimension with regard to the economic one, and it is likely to move the cen-
ter of gravity of partisan competition in the direction of cultural (but not necessarily 
economic) demarcation/protection. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to analyse the impact of globalization on the national political space, we study 
six Western European countries: Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, Austria, and 
the Netherlands. These countries are very similar in many respects, but present some 
                                                 
10  For electoral systems, see van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (forthcoming), Carter (2002), Golder (2003), Ignazi 
(2003: 183), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Swank and Betz (2003), Veugeleers and Magnan (forthcoming); for 
the type of democracy – consensus or majoritarian democracy, see Kitschelt (1995), Plasser and Ulram (2000), 
Billiet (1998: 189), Billiet and Swyngedouw (1999: 168). 
11  See: Abedi (2002), Hainsworth (1992), Ignazi (1992, 2003: 207-212), Kitschelt (1995), Kriesi (1999), Mair 
(1995), Sauger (2004), van der Brug et al. (forthcoming), Veugelers and Magnan (forthcoming). 
12  See: Kriesi (1999), Mayer and Perrineau (1989: 345), Schain (1987: 239f.), Luther (2003), Henisch (2003). 
13  See van der Brug (2003), Husbands (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002). 
14  For recent empirical evidence for this last thesis, see van der Brug et al. (forthcoming). 
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systematic contextual variations. Note in particular that Austria, France, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, but not Britain and Germany have experienced the forceful mobiliza-
tion of a right-wing populist party. Our comparative analysis focuses on national elec-
tions. We consider these still to be the crucibles for the structuring of national political 
contexts.15 We shall analyse three elections of the 1990s and early 2000s and, for each 
country, we add one electoral contest from the 1970s as a point of reference from a pe-
riod before the national politics were undergoing the presumed restructuring effect of 
globalization. We include several elections of the nineties in our analysis, because we 
assume, in line with a renewed realignment-theory (Martin 2000), that a structural trans-
formation of the national political context may occur across a series of critical elections 
over an extended period of time. For the analysis of the supply side of electoral compe-
tition, which will be the focus of our attention here, we assume that the macro-historical 
structural change linked to globalization is articulated by the issue-specific positions 
taken by the parties during the electoral campaigns and by the salience they attribute to 
the different issues. We also consider that the most appropriate way to analyze the posi-
tioning of parties and the way in which they deal with the new issues linked with glob-
alization is to focus on the political debate during electoral campaigns, as reflected by 
the mass media. While we focus here only on the supply side of electoral competition, 
the restructuring of party systems involves changes in both parties’ positions and voters’ 
alignments. Beyond this paper, we seek in the broader framework of our research pro-
ject to analyze both aspects jointly. To this end, we need to consider the content of the 
campaign as voters may receive it – hence our focus on the mass media. Furthermore, 
we consider both the saliency with which parties address certain issues and the positions 
(pro or contra) they take. While extensive research based on party manifestos has shown 
that parties tend to avoid direct confrontation and that they differ from each other 
mainly through the selective emphasis of their priorities (see Budge 2001 for a review), 
we also know that new issues usually do not have a valence character, and that direct 
confrontation – i.e. parties advocating diverging positions on political issues – is much 
more pronounced in the media and during electoral campaigns than in party pro-
grammes (Budge & Farlie 1983: 281). The voters, too, see the parties mainly in con-
frontational terms. Furthermore, if we want to relate the parties’ preferences to those of 
the voters, we need to measure them in a comparable way. And, in most election stud-
ies, the voters’ issue preferences are assessed in terms of position or direction, rather 
than in terms of their salience (Pellikaan et al. 2003).  
                                                 
15  National elections are more appropriate than European elections, as the latter are mostly second-order national 
elections (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996). 
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The obvious disadvantage of this methodological choice is that we cannot rely on al-
ready existing data, but have to produce our own data. In order to identify the salience 
of the campaign issues for the various parties and their issue-specific positions we rely 
on a content analysis of the editorial part of major daily newspapers. For each country 
we chose a quality paper and a tabloid.16 For each one of the four electoral campaigns 
that we analyze per country, all the articles related to the electoral contest or to politics 
in general have been selected in both newspapers for the last two months before Elec-
tion Day. For the articles selected the headlines, the ‘lead’ and the first paragraph were 
coded sentence by sentence using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his col-
laborators (see Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1997; Kleinnijenhuis & Pennings 2001). This 
method is designed to code every relationship between ‘political objects’ (i.e. either 
between two political actors or between a political actor and a political issue) appearing 
in the text. For the present purposes, we are only interested in relationships between 
political actors, on the one hand, and political issues on the other. Each sentence is re-
duced to its most basic structure (the so called ‘core sentence’) indicating only its sub-
ject (political actor) and its object (issue) as well as the direction of the relationship be-
tween the two. The direction is quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1 (with 
three intermediary positions). 
Political actors were coded according to their party membership. For the present 
analysis, we have regrouped them into a limited number of categories or analyzed just 
the most important parties respectively, from three in Britain to eight in France. These 
parties or groups of parties are the following ones:  
¾ Austria: Greens, Social-democrats (SPÖ), Liberals (Liberales Forum), Chris-
tian-Democrats (ÖVP), Populist right (FPÖ). 
¾ Britain: Social-democrats (Labour), Liberals (Liberal Democrats), Conserva-
tives. 
¾ France: Radical Left (PCF, Trotskyist parties), Greens, Social-democrats 
(PSF), the MRG,17 Conservatives (RPR), Liberals (UDF)18, Populist right (FN). 
¾ Germany: Radical Left (PDS), Greens, Social-democrats (SPD), Liberals 
(FDP), Christian-democrats (CDU/CSU). 
                                                 
16  The selected newspapers were Die Presse and Kronenzeitung in Austria, The Times and The Sun in Britain, Le 
Monde and Le Parisien in France, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Bild in Germany, NRC Handelsblad and Algemeen 
Dagblad in the Netherlands, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Blick in Switzerland. 
17  It is difficult to classify the MRG (Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche) into one of the major party families. It is 
rather left-of-centre and was one of the three ‘pillars’ of the left-wing opposition in the 1970s (with the PCF and 
the PSF). But it cannot simply be subsumed into the Social-Democratic party family. 
18  The UDF has both a liberal and a christian-democratic component. 
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¾ Netherlands: Greens, Social-democrats (PvdA), Christian-democrats (CDA), 
Liberals (D66, VVD), Populist right (LPF). 
¾ Switzerland: Greens, Social-democrats (SP), Christian-democrats (CVP and 
other minor centre parties), Liberals (FDP and LPS), Populist right (SVP and 
small parties of the New Radical Right).  
We cannot, however, consider all parties in all elections. As a matter of fact, some of 
them were not present during the whole period that we analyse. The Lijst Pim Fortuyn, 
for example, was only present in the 2002 Dutch election. Smaller parties must some-
times also be excluded, when we do not have enough information on their issue posi-
tions.19 
For the political issues, we used a detailed coding schema, distinguishing between 
200 or more categories (depending on the country). For the analysis, we have regrouped 
them into a limited number of broader categories. The regrouping into more encompass-
ing categories is important for both theoretical and technical reasons. From a theoretical 
perspective, the specific issues raised during a campaign vary from one election to the 
other as a result of the policy attention cycle, which in turn depends on the development 
of the policy-making process in the various political subsystems of a given polity (see 
also van der Brug 1999, 2001). Issues may come up on the electoral agenda as a result 
of internal dynamics in certain political subsystems or as a result of external shocks – 
catastrophes (such as September 11 in 2001, the flood in Eastern Germany 2002, or the 
war in Kosovo in 1999) or economic crises. Although the specific issues raised during a 
given campaign are, therefore, somewhat unpredictable, they still refer to only a limited 
set of basic structural conflicts, which they articulate in variable ways. The theoretical 
challenge is to regroup the variable set of specific issues into a limited, but exhaustive 
set of basic categories capable of capturing the underlying dimensions of conflict. 
Technically, we also need a limited set of categories so as to have enough cases per 
category for all elections covered. It is important to keep in mind that the results of the 
analysis crucially depend on this seemingly technical operation of regrouping the issues. 
For our purposes, we propose the following 12 categories: 
¾ Welfare: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state re-
trenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment pro-
grams, health care programs. Valence issues such as ‘against unemployment’ 
or ‘against recession’ were dropped if there was no specification of whether the 
goal was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation. 
¾ Budget: Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures, re-
duction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution. 
                                                 
19  In each election, we consider only parties for which at least thirty issue positions were coded. 
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¾ Economic liberalism (ecolib): Support for deregulation, for more competition, 
and for privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the pro-
posed measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distin-
guishing criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protec-
tionism in agriculture and other sectors. 
¾ Cultural liberalism (cultlib): Support for the goals of the new social move-
ments, with the exception of the environmental movement: Peace, solidarity 
with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for cultural diver-
sity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and Nato), sup-
port for the United Nations. Opposition to racism, support for the right to abor-
tion and euthanasia. Opposition to patriotism, to calls for national solidarity, 
the defence of tradition and of national sovereignty, and to traditional moral 
values, support for a liberal drugs policy. 
¾ Europe: Support for European integration – including enlargement – or for EU-
membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria. 
¾ Culture: Support for education, culture, and scientific research. 
¾ Immigration: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for 
the restriction of the number of foreigners. 
¾ Army: Support for the army (including Nato), for a strong national defence and 
for nuclear weapons. 
¾ Security: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political 
corruption. 
¾ Environment (eco): support for environmental protection, opposition to atomic 
energy. 
¾ Institutional reform (iref): Support for various institutional reforms such as the 
extension of direct democratic rights, modifications in the structure of the po-
litical system, federalism and decentralization, calls for the efficiency of gov-
ernment and public administration, New Public Management. 
¾ Infrastructure (infra): Support for the improvement of the infrastructure (roads, 
railways, etc.).  
The first three categories refer to the traditional economic opposition between state and 
market, i.e. to the class-based opposition between left and right. On this dimension, the 
left tends to defend the welfare state while the right tends to support economic liberal-
ism and budgetary rigor.20 More recently, Third Way approaches have come to blur the 
distinctions, as has the recognition on both sides of the traditional divide that structural 
                                                 
20  Economic protectionism is part of the economic liberalism category (with opposing sign), since there were only 
few core sentences defending this goal. 
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budgetary deficits cannot be sustained forever. The next six categories all refer to the 
cultural dimension. We first distinguish between three categories defending a universal-
istic, cosmopolitan point of view: support for cultural liberalism, European integration 
and education, culture and research. Next, we add three categories for the opposing 
point of view: support for a tough immigration policy, law and order and a strong army. 
A tough immigration policy is the closest we get to the notion of national protection. 
There are three additional categories – environmental protection, promotion of institu-
tional reform and support for infrastructural projects. The second of these is somewhat 
heterogeneous, as it may relate to very different types of reforms. While environmental 
protection has come to be assimilated to the class-based left-right divide in some coun-
tries, we do not assume here a priori that it is part of this traditional divide. It is an em-
pirical question how strongly ecological and economic concerns are associated. 
All categories are formulated in such a way that they have a clear direction. For ex-
ample, the relationship with the category ‘Europe’ of a party supporting the adhesion of 
Switzerland to the EU takes a positive value (+1). Or, if a party advocates an increase in 
the state’s expenditures, its relationship with the category ‘budget’ will be negative (-1). 
This kind of data offer valuable information on two central aspects of the supply side of 
electoral competition: the positions of political parties regarding the various political 
issues, and the salience of these issues for a given political party. The position of an 
actor on a category of issues is computed by averaging over all core sentences which 
contain a relationship between this actor and any of the issues belonging to this cate-
gory.21 The salience of a category of issues refers to the relative frequency with which a 
given political party takes a position on this category. It is important to understand that 
both aspects are relevant for an adequate description of the political space. Parties do 
not only differ from one another with respect to the positions they advocate, but also 
with respect to the priorities they set. It is also important to note that the salience of is-
sues and parties can be computed in different ways. Here, party-issue relationships are 
weighted by the number of statements of a given party in a given campaign and by the 
relative importance of the corresponding issue category for the party in question. This 
means that, for a given campaign, large parties and key campaign issues determine the 
configuration of the political space more heavily than marginal parties or secondary 
issues. Each electoral campaign, however, is given the same weight, even if the amount 
of media coverage varies from one campaign to the other.  
On the basis of these data, it is possible to construct a graphical representation of the 
positions of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space, using the method of Multi-
                                                 
21  The positions of the parties on the different categories of issues and the corresponding saliences can be found in 
the appendix, in tables A1 to A12. 
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dimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a very flexible method that allows for the graphic 
representation of similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects (Borg & Gro-
enen 1997; Cox & Cox 2001; Kruskal & Wish 1978)22. In our case, the issue positions 
of parties give us information on the ‘similarity’ or ‘distance’ between a group of par-
ties and a group of issues. If a party from the Left, for example, strongly supports an 
expansion of the welfare state, we would expect the distance between this party and the 
category ‘welfare’ to be small. If we represent the parties and issues in a common space, 
this party and the category ‘welfare’ should be located close to each other. The unfold-
ing technique, the MDS-procedure which we use here, indeed, allows for the joint rep-
resentation of parties and issues in a common space23. 
Furthermore, a variant of MDS, called Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling 
(WMMDS), allows to account simultaneously for the similarities between pairs of ob-
jects (parties and issues, in our case) and for the salience of these relationships.24 This 
means that, when representing our data in a low-dimensional space, the distances corre-
sponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than 
the less salient ones. Distortions of ‘real’ distances are unavoidable. But with WMMDS, 
these distortions will be smaller for more salient relationships, resulting in a more accu-
rate representation of the relative positions of parties and issues. 
Relying on MDS has an additional advantage which is crucial for our argument. 
With this method, we do not have to make any a priori assumption about the structure 
of the political space. Most analyses of parties’ positions start from theoretically defined 
dimensions (Gabel & Hix 2002; Hix 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; Klingemann et al. 1994; 
Pellikaan et al. 2003; Pennings and Keman 2003; van der Eijk & Franklin 2004). Here, 
by contrast, we want to test our hypotheses regarding both the dimensionality of the 
political space and the nature of these dimensions. The structure of the political space 
that we estimate with MDS is not influenced by any assumption we could make on how 
the categories of issues should be related to one another.  
                                                 
22  Another method that has been used extensively to extract policy positions from manifesto data is factor analysis 
(Budge et al. 1987; Laver & Budge 1992; Cole 2005). However, as van der Brug (1999: 120) has argued, factor 
analysis is not a valid method to analyse this type of data (proximity data just as our own). Psychometricians have 
repeatedly demonstrated that the use of factor analysis on proximity data is prone to give deceptive results. 
23  Van de Brug (1999, 2001) uses another MDS-procedure that does not allow for the joint representation of parties 
and issues in a common space, which renders the interpretation of the results much more difficult. 
24  Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling can be estimated using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented 
in SPSS. 
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RESULTS 
Before examining the results of our MDS analyses, it is useful to present a few general 
observations regarding the major political actors in these six countries and the issues 
which have dominated the different electoral campaigns. Changes over time in the 
strength of the political parties do not necessarily result from a change in the cleavage 
structure. But as we have argued above, the emergence of new players on the electoral 
scene or a radical transformation of some established parties constitute first symptoms 
of the expected transformation of the cleavage structure. The emergence of Green par-
ties during the 1980s is a trend that characterises all countries considered here – with the 
exception of Britain. In the most recent elections, Green parties received a share of vote 
ranging from five per cent in the Netherlands to ten per cent in Austria. They clearly do 
not belong to the major parties. But their influence on the structure of party systems 
may nevertheless be important. As they stand in direct competition with socialist par-
ties, the latter may change their position on some issues in order not to loose part of 
their electorate.  
While most countries are characterised by an important change on the left, not all 
countries have seen the emergence of important new actors of the populist right. As 
indicated above, among the countries considered here, there are four such cases: the 
Front National (FN) in France and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands, the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The FN is proba-
bly the most successful new party of the populist right. While its leader, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen was already a candidate in the 1974 presidential election, the FN became an impor-
tant force in French politics only in the 1980s. He received about 15 per cent of votes in 
the first round of the 1988 and 1995 elections. And in 2002, he even succeeded in beat-
ing the socialist Jospin and getting into the second round of the election. While the FN 
is clearly authoritarian on cultural issues, its profile on economic issues is less clear-cut. 
It is rather favourable to economic liberalism, but it also defends the welfare state – 
though immigrants should be excluded from its benefits.  
The Swiss SVP and the Austrian FPÖ are both transformed former mainstream par-
ties – the SVP previously a conservative party, the FPÖ previously a liberal-
conservative one. Both changed their profile radically, putting a much stronger empha-
sis on cultural issues. This change brought them remarkable electoral success. While the 
FPÖ’s share of the vote in national elections was only about five to six per cent in the 
1970s and early 1980s, it increased up to 27 per cent in the 1999 election, as large a 
share as that of the Christian-Democratic ÖVP, and close to the result of the Social-
democrats (33 per cent). This success, however, was followed by a downturn in the 
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2002 election, when Jörg Haider’s party25 only received 10 per cent of the vote. In Swit-
zerland, the success of the SVP has been just as impressive: traditionally the smallest of 
the four governing parties, with no more than 12 per cent of votes in the 1970s and 
1980s, it has continuously increased its share of the vote throughout the 1990s. In the 
2003 election of the National Council, it even became the first party, with almost 27 per 
cent of the votes. 
In Britain and Germany, changes on the right-hand side of the political spectrum 
were less pronounced. Recently, parties of the radical or populist right have had some 
success in German regional and local elections, but they are not, for the moment at least, 
represented in the Bundestag. In the United Kingdom, right-wing populist or nationalist 
parties, like the British National Party, remain marginal. 
We can also look for symptoms of the new cleavage by considering the salience of 
different categories of issues. As we explained above, three of our twelve issue catego-
ries correspond to the traditional left-right divide, while six are characteristic of the cul-
tural divide. In Figure 2, we present the development of the salience of these two 
groups of issues. The figure shows a general trend: over the last decades, economic is-
sues have lost in salience in all countries except Germany. In the 1970s, they were more 
important than cultural issues in Austria, Britain, and in France, while they were of 
roughly the same importance in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. By the 
year 2000, France remains the only case where economic issues still are clearly domi-
nant. This points to the expected increase in importance of the new cultural dimension. 
The German exception conforms to expectations insofar as right-wing populist parties 
did not have any electoral success in this country. The British result is unexpected, 
however: in Great Britain, the cultural dimension became more important, although 
right-wing populist parties did not have any electoral success. This can be explained by 
the fact that the British Conservative Party has been among the most nationalist in 
Europe and was deeply divided on the issue of European integration since the 1990s. 
                                                 
25  Jörg Haider stepped down as party leader in 2000 but he is still its most prominent exponent. 
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Figure 2: Saliency of economic an cultural issues 
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We are, of course, mainly interested in the configuration of the partisan space and in its 
transformation from the seventies to the end of the nineties. Accordingly, we have per-
formed two MDS analyses for each country – one for the election of the 1970s and an-
other one for the three most recent ballots. The number of ‘objects’ to be positioned 
varies between these elections, since we have excluded from the analysis categories 
with a low degree of salience. Moreover, as we have already indicated, we consider 
only parties or groups of parties for whom we have a minimum number of observa-
tions.26 To allow us to capture changes in the parties’ positions, we have computed the 
distances between parties and issues separately for each election. The resulting configu-
rations are presented in Figures 3 to 8. 
The configurations resulting from an MDS analysis can only be interpreted with re-
spect to the distances between the objects. The orientation of a configuration is arbi-
trary, which implies that it can be freely rotated. To facilitate the comparison of these 
configurations, we have rotated them in such a way that the issues ‘welfare’ and ‘eco-
nomic liberalism’ lie on a horizontal line, with ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ po-
sitioned on the left and on the right respectively. We have also drawn two orthogonal 
axes, which cross at the mid-point of the interval separating ‘welfare’ from ‘economic 
liberalism’. These axes are not a product of the WMMDS analysis itself; they were sim-
ply added to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The configurations were also re-
scaled so that the range of distances between parties and issues is similar to the range of 
the original distances.27 Finally, we have also connected the points of the three major 
                                                 
26  In each election, we have included only parties with at least 30 observations. The only exception to this rule is the 
case of the Liberal Democrats. As it is an important party, we have included it in all elections – even if we had 
less than 30 observations in 2001. Categories of issues with less than three per cent of observations in one analy-
sis were also disregarded. 
27  The rescaling procedure is necessary, because the absolute values of the original distances are transformed when 
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parties in each election. On the basis of these triangles, it is easier to follow the evolu-
tion of the parties’ positions. 
In each case, we found a two-dimensional solution to be appropriate. On the horizon-
tal dimension, in all six countries, there is a sharp opposition between support for the 
welfare state and support for economic liberalism. The distance between the two corre-
sponding points is often among the largest ones. This indicates that, in all the countries 
compared, the traditional economic conflict remains very salient. The vertical dimen-
sion can be interpreted as a cultural opposition in each and every country. The nature of 
this opposition varies slightly between countries, but by the 1990s, the cultural conflict 
is typically expressed by the strong opposition between support for cultural liberalism, 
on the one hand, and support for a more restrictive immigration policy, on the other. 
While the political space of these six countries was already characterized by the two 
dimensions in the 1970s, we should note that the cultural dimension was, in part at least, 
based on different issues. We shall see how the national configurations have been trans-
formed by considering them in more detail.  
Figure 3: Germany  
a) 1976  
 
b) 1994-2002  
 
                                                                                                                                               
performing a weighted MDS. This procedure does not affect the relative distances between the points in a given 
configuration, but it makes possible a comparison of the absolute distances between two configurations. The re-
scaling was performed by setting the weighted average distance between parties and issues in the final configura-
tion equal to the same average in the original data (with distances being weighted by their corresponding sali-
ence). 
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Figure 4: Austria  
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b) 1994, 1999, 2002  
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Figure 7: France  
a) 1978  
 
b) 1995-2002  
 
 
Figure 8: Britain  
a) 1974 (February)  
 
b) 1992-2001  
  
We start by examining the case of Germany (Figure 3). The two-dimensional structure 
is clearly visible, both in 1976 and in the 1990s. In the seventies, the cultural dimension 
is marked by the strong opposition between support for cultural liberalism, on the one 
hand, and support for a strong army and a restrictive budgetary policy, on the other. The 
poles of this vertical dimension are almost equidistant to ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liber-
alism’. This shows that the two main conflicts that structure the political space were 
hardly related to each other. The three main parties – Social-Democrats, Liberals, and 
Christian-Democrats – take distinct positions that form a triangular structure as has al-
ready been pointed out by Pappi (1984). The SPD is located in the upper left-hand cor-
ner, supporting cultural liberalism and defending the welfare state rather than economic 
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liberalism. The SPD also favours environmental protection but opposes budgetary rigor 
and a reinforcement of the army. The FDP, in turn, supports both cultural and economic 
liberalism, but is more distant from environmental protection. The CDU/CSU, finally, is 
also closer to economic liberalism than to a strong welfare state. It distinguishes itself 
from the other parties, however, with respect to cultural liberalism. The Union parties 
represent the conservative pole of the cultural dimension.  
In the more recent elections, we find that the political space is structured by the same 
two dimensions. In line with our expectations, however, the character of the cultural 
dimension has changed. Immigration has now become a salient issue, and it is the one 
most distant from cultural liberalism. Support for the army, for budgetary rigor, culture 
and environmental protection, have become more consensual issues, which is reflected 
in their more central location in the configuration. Although the CDU/CSU has changed 
its position several times, it still occupies the same place, while the FDP and especially 
the SPD have moved to a more centrally located position by the nineties. They have 
above all moderated their position on the cultural dimension. As a consequence, the 
distances between the three main parties have become smaller. As suggested by the 
convergence hypothesis (see references in note 12), the convergence of the major par-
ties has been compensated by the emergence of new parties. The Greens and the PDS 
are located in the upper left corner – close to the former location of the Social-
Democrats. They defend the welfare state, favour cultural liberalism, and are very dis-
tant from a restrictive immigration policy. No new right-wing populist party has suc-
ceeded in establishing itself as a competitor of the CDU/CSU, however, although the 
potential for such a party exists, as the temporary successes of the radical right in re-
gional elections indicate. Ignazi (2003: 82) concludes that the radical populist right has 
failed in Germany so far, ‘because of lack of legitimacy, linkage to the past, and inner 
structural weakness.’ One might add the repositioning of the CDU/CSU as one more 
explanatory factor: although it has not decisively changed its overall position, in the 
course of the nineties, together with its main competitors, the CDU/CSU moved further 
away from cultural liberalism and closer to a tough stance on immigration. 
The configuration of the Austrian political space is quite similar to the German case 
(Figure 4). In 1975, the cultural dimension is marked by the opposition between support 
for culture and cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and budgetary rigor, on the other.28 
We also notice, quite surprisingly, that environmental protection is closely associated 
with the FPÖ. This was, however, a low-key issue that was salient only in the campaign 
of the FPÖ. As far as the configuration of parties is concerned, we first notice that all 
three are quite distant from economic liberalism. Even the two mainstream parties of the 
                                                 
28  In Austria, the army did not constitute a salient issue and was excluded from the analysis. 
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right are supportive of the welfare state. They have different profiles, however, with 
respect to the cultural dimension. Already at that time, the FPÖ strongly opposed cul-
tural liberalism, while the ÖVP took a more moderate position, closer to that of the So-
cial-Democrats.  
Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the structure of the political space has changed in 
a way similar to what we observed for Germany. ‘Cultural liberalism’ still forms one 
pole of the integration-demarcation divide, but it is now most distant from the new issue 
of ‘immigration’. The transformation of the FPÖ into a right-wing populist party is most 
clearly expressed in the transformation of the meaning of the cultural dimension and in 
a general move of the party triangle in a more protectionist direction. With regard to the 
economic dimension, the ÖVP has taken a more central position and is now much closer 
to economic liberalism than the Freedom Party. Surprisingly, the FPÖ’s position is quite 
removed from Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula.’ From a liberal-conservative position in the 
early nineties, it has, in fact, moved to a protectionist position on both dimensions. Like 
in Germany, the change in the position of the Social-Democrats has been accompanied 
by the emergence of a Green party, who has a somewhat more left-libertarian profile 
than the SPÖ. Finally, the transformation of the FPÖ so far has prevented the emer-
gence of new right-wing populist challengers.  
In Switzerland, we again find a two-dimensional structure in the 1970s (Figure 5). 
‘Welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ are the poles of the economic dimension, while the 
opposition between ‘cultural liberalism’ and support for the army constitutes the cul-
tural axis. Contrary to the previous cases, however, we already notice some signs of an 
integration of these two axes, since ‘cultural liberalism’ and ‘welfare state’ can be found 
at almost the same location. The Social-democrats (SP) and the Christian-democrats 
(CVP) are close to this left-liberal pole, in opposition to the Liberals and the Conserva-
tives (SVP). Like in Austria, none of the four major parties fully endorses economic 
liberalism. This issue takes a peripheral position in the political space.  
Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the structure of the Swiss political space and the 
parties’ positions have changed more radically than in the two countries considered pre-
viously. The economic opposition is still present, although it has become somewhat less 
salient, as is indicated by the smaller distance between its two poles. Most important in 
this respect, however, is the sharp change in the position of liberal and conservative 
parties. Their positions are now very close to economic liberalism. Their shift has led to 
a stronger polarisation of the Swiss political space. As far as the cultural dimension is 
concerned, ‘cultural liberalism’ and ‘welfare state’ are still close to each other, but a 
new opposition has emerged between European integration and a restrictive immigra-
tion policy. The transformed cultural dimension remains partially integrated into the 
traditional left-right divide, which provides a nice illustration of the latter’s integrative 
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capacity: on the one side, the parties most favourable to European integration – SP and 
CVP – are at the same time closer to the welfare state than to economic liberalism. On 
the opposite side, the Swiss People’s Party and the smaller parties of the radical right 
defend both an economic liberalism and a more restrictive immigration policy. Contrary 
to the FPÖ, the SVP seems to follow Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula.’ This strategy has 
devastated the radical right challengers in Switzerland, as predicted by the polarization 
hypothesis (see references in note 12). In addition, it has allowed the SVP to grow at the 
detriment of its mainstream competitors on the right. While the major Swiss parties are 
aligned along this left-integrative vs. right-conservative axis, the Greens take a distinct 
position, in the lower-left hand corner. They are closer to the defence of the welfare 
state than to economic liberalism. But at the same time, they distance themselves from 
both European integration and a restrictive immigration policy.  
The case of the Netherlands shares many similarities with Switzerland (Figure 6). 
Here too, the economic and cultural dimensions are already partly integrated in the 
1970s. Support for cultural liberalism and for the welfare state are quite closely related 
and both opposed to economic liberalism, on the economic dimension, and to the army, 
on the cultural one. With five parties, the party system is more fragmented, but we can 
still identify three poles. The Social-Democrats, along with the Greens and D66, take a 
left-liberal position. The Christian-Democrats, similarly to their Swiss or Austrian coun-
terparts, are also in favour of a strong welfare state and take a moderately liberal posi-
tion on the cultural axis. The VVD, finally, differs from the latter by its more liberal 
orientation on economic issues.  
By the nineties, a clear transformation of the cultural dimension has taken place. It 
now opposes ‘European integration’ and ‘cultural liberalism’ to support for a restrictive 
immigration policy. In this respect, the Dutch transformation resembles the Swiss one. 
Furthermore, as in the Swiss case, the two dimensions are more integrated than in Ger-
many or Austria. ‘Cultural liberalism’ is still close to ‘welfare’, and the issue of immi-
gration is much more distant from ‘welfare’ than from ‘economic liberalism’. In the 
Netherlands, however, the most impressive changes regard the positions of the parties. 
The major parties were aligned along a Europe vs. immigration axis in 1994, with the 
PvdA and the Greens forming the left-integrationist pole. Over the following years, 
however, the parties on the left and, to a lesser extent, the Christian-Democrats, have 
radically changed their position. They have become more distant from European inte-
gration and from cultural liberalism. Such a change is characteristic not only of the 
PvdA, but also of the Greens and of D66. In 2002, these left parties are still closer to the 
welfare state than to economic liberalism. But at the same time, they oppose both a re-
strictive immigration policy and European integration. As a matter of fact, their new 
position shares many similarities with that of the Greens in Switzerland. 2002, of 
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course, is also the first election in which the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) has made its entry 
into Dutch politics. The LPF takes a rather undifferentiated position on the economic 
divide. By contrast, it clearly favours a demarcation strategy with respect to the new 
cultural conflict, although it has a more differentiated view on immigration than the 
other right-wing populist parties. It is the party located at the greatest distance from 
European integration and from cultural liberalism. Contrary to the Swiss case, however, 
the emergence of the LPF has not led to a polarisation of the political space, but to a 
more extreme version of the German development: the established parties have all 
moved towards each other and in the direction of the LPF, a development which neither 
the convergence, nor the polarization hypothesis is able to predict, but which is in line 
with our expectation that the emergence of a populist party on the right gives rise to a 
move of the center of gravity of the party system in the direction of cultural demarca-
tion/protectionism. Note, however, that this move began well before the emergence of 
the LPF and that convergence has gone well beyond what one might have expected.  
The French political space of 1978 also shows some signs of an integration of the 
economic and cultural divides (Figure 7). Like in Switzerland and in the Netherlands, 
support for cultural liberalism is much closer to the support of the welfare state than to 
economic liberalism. Similarly, in the seventies, all the political parties are also quite 
distant from economic liberalism. At one end of the political spectrum, the Socialist 
party supports the welfare state and cultural liberalism. At the other extreme, the Gaull-
ists are quite strongly opposed to cultural liberalism, while taking an intermediary posi-
tion on the economic dimension. The transformation of the political space has followed 
the pattern we already know from the other countries. The cultural dimension now op-
poses cultural liberalism and support for European integration, on the one side, and sup-
port for a more restrictive immigration policy, on the other. The French configuration is 
different from other countries to the extent that European integration and cultural liber-
alism are more consensual among the mainstream parties. With the emergence of the 
Front National, the structure of the party system is becoming increasingly tripolar, as 
has already been observed by Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997a, 1997b, 2003). The 
Socialists have moved toward the centre – but less markedly than the German SPD. 
They remain strong supporters of the welfare state and of cultural liberalism. The RPR, 
by contrast, has changed its position more substantially. It has moved closer to the inte-
grationist pole of the cultural divide and now occupies a position which can hardly be 
distinguished from that of the UDF – a result that is not surprising, given the close col-
laboration of the two forces in the UMP. The two partners – RPR and UDF – differ 
from the Socialists on the economic dimension and from the FN on the cultural one. 
The FN has a clear anti-immigration profile. On the economic dimension, it is some-
what closer to economic liberalism than to the welfare state. By French standards, this 
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makes it the most economically liberal party, suggesting that it also tends to opt for 
Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula.’ 
Turning, finally, to Britain, we observe a low level of polarisation in 1974 (February) 
(Figure 8). The three parties are very closely located to one another. Their positions are 
rather undifferentiated, especially with respect to economic issues: all three are strong 
supporters of the welfare state. As far as issues of the cultural dimension are concerned, 
there is some opposition between the Labour and the Conservatives – the former de-
fending cultural liberalism and the latter supporting law and order. Surprisingly, envi-
ronmental protection and European integration are both located at the periphery of the 
political space. Both issues are not integrated in a more general division. As a matter of 
fact, they are strongly rejected by all three parties. The amorphous structure of the Brit-
ish political space of the early seventies has become more clear-cut in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Support for environmental protection is now integrated in the major left-
right division and Europe forms one of the poles of the cultural dimension, along with 
cultural liberalism and institutional reforms. Contrary to the other countries, however, 
the salience of the immigration question remains very low in British electoral contests 
and we could not include it in the analysis29. As far as the positioning of the parties in 
the transformed space is concerned, compared to the early seventies, it has become 
more polarized by the early nineties. But the polarization has been of only a temporary 
nature. By the elections of 1997, Third Way politics have moved the Labour party to the 
middle ground on the economic dimension, where it stayed in 2001. On the cultural 
dimension, the Conservatives are strongly opposed to cultural liberalism and especially 
to European integration, while Labour and the Liberal Democrats take a more integra-
tionist position. But the Liberal Democrats have moved towards the Conservatives since 
1992, while Labour took a more resolute profile in favour of cultural liberalism in the 
2001 election. Finally, no challenger worth mentioning has made its entry into the Brit-
ish party space. 
DISCUSSION 
Taken together, these analyses allow us to identify several common features of the 
structure of the national political space in the six countries. The first one is its two-
dimensionality. In all countries considered here, we can identify an economic and a cul-
tural dimension, both in the 1970s and in the more recent elections. These two dimen-
sions are in some cases partially integrated – like in Switzerland, in the Netherlands or 
in France – but they never coincide. On the one hand, it is thus necessary to go beyond a 
simple description of the political space in terms of a one-dimensional left-right divide. 
This contradicts those observers who maintain that European party systems are on their 
                                                 
29  This is likely to change for the 2005 elections, however. 
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way to bipolarity (e.g. Bale 2003; for Austria in particular, Müller & Fallend 2004). In 
line with the results of Hooghe et al. (2002) and those of Gabel and Hix (2002), it also 
contradicts the ‘regulation model,’ which argues that issues linked with European Inte-
gration are fully integrated into the traditional left-right dimension (Marks & Steenber-
gen 2002). On the other hand, the new cleavage did not lead to the emergence of any 
additional dimension. Rather than constituting an additional dimension, the new con-
flicts were integrated into the existing two-dimensional structure. This is strong support 
for our embedding hypothesis and contradicts observers who maintain that West Euro-
pean policy spaces are characterized by the existence of three dimensions (Warwick 
2002). The present analysis confirms an earlier MDS-analysis of the Flemish political 
space at the time of the 1991 Belgian national elections which also resulted in a two-
dimensional structure with substantively quite similar dimensions (Swyngedouw 1995). 
Our results also bear some resemblance to those based on factor analyses of party mani-
festos. Thus, Budge et al. (1987) and Cole (2005) also argue that a two-dimensional 
structure is most appropriate to describe the political space of a considerable number of 
countries. However, our results support this hypothesis much more strongly: Budge and 
his co-authors, as well as Cole, actually obtained more than two factors and arbitrarily 
limited their analysis to two. By contrast, our analysis only yields two dimensions. 
Moreover, factor analyses of party manifestos usually require additional assumptions in 
order to avoid problems related to the small number of observations. Thus, Budge et al. 
(1987) must assume that the dimensions of the political space have remained unchanged 
during the period they cover (ca. 1945-1980), while Cole (2005) must assume that the 
structure of the political space is identical in the four countries she analyzes (Austria, 
France, Germany, Italia). The variations over time and between countries in our results 
show that both of these assumptions are problematic30. 
A second important similarity of these national political spaces concerns the trans-
formation of the cultural dimension. In the 1970s, this dimension was dominated by 
issues linked to cultural liberalism. The parties’ positions with respect to the army were 
also structured along this dimension. Over the following decades, new issues have been 
integrated into the cultural dimension. The most important of these is immigration. This 
theme was absent from the debate in the 1970s. Since then, however, it has become a 
salient and much polarising issue. In Switzerland, Britain, and the Netherlands, the 
question of European integration now also characterises this second dimension. In spite 
of a rather high level of euroscepticism it does not do so in Austria, because Europe was 
not an important issue in the observed elections. On the other hand, some older issues 
                                                 
30  Van de Brug (1999, 2001) similarly criticizes these assumptions, which do not allow for the possibility that the 
relevant issues and the dimensions of the space vary from one election and from one country to the other.  
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have now been integrated into the traditional economic left-right divide. This is espe-
cially the case for environmental protection in all countries except Germany. Like in the 
1970s, party competition is basically structured by an economic and a cultural dimen-
sion. However, the character of the two dimension has changed. The transformation of 
the cultural dimension in particular is strong evidence for the structuring capacity of the 
purported new integration/demarcation cleavage. 
Third, the distinction between the two dimensions of the political space is all the 
more important as the positions of parties usually vary as strongly with respect to the 
cultural issues as with respect to the economic ones. Both dimensions are polarising. 
Furthermore, the cultural dimension has been gaining in importance as it has become 
the primary basis on which new parties or transformed established parties seek to mobi-
lise their electorate. As it turns out, parties of the populist right do not stand out for their 
economic profile. It is on cultural issues, where they support a demarcation strategy 
much more strongly than (untransformed) mainstream parties. Similarly, on the left, the 
Social-Democrats and the Greens both defend the welfare state, while they have differ-
ent positions on cultural issues. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, the Greens 
still strongly favour cultural liberalism, while the Social-Democrats have moderated 
their position on these issues. As already observed, Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Diez 
Medrano (2004), who analyze the attitudes of Europeans with regard to European inte-
gration similarly come to the conclusion that these attitudes primarily depend on identi-
tarian characteristics and not on economic interests as has been maintained by the rele-
vant literature so far. 
The common features of the transformation of the national political space in the six 
countries mainly concern the basic structure of the space. Within the basic structural 
framework, the configurations of the main parties have, except for France, been tripolar 
already back in the seventies. They remain or have become more or less tripolar in all 
six countries in the course of the nineties. The populist right constitutes a new third pole 
in France. In all the other countries, the three poles are still being defined by the parties 
who have traditionally represented the three most important political camps – the So-
cial-democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives (or Christian-Democrats), although 
in Austria and Switzerland one of these parties has definitely changed its character and 
has become the equivalent of the FN in France. In the Netherlands, the LPF has tempo-
rarily constituted the third pole, but its precipitous decline resuscitated the traditional 
triangle whose poles may, as a result of this decline, move apart again. In Germany and 
in Britain, the traditional Conservative pole has not (yet) met with any serious challenge 
and still represents the unreconstructed third pole. The basic tripolar configuration of 
the party systems is an additional indication that we need two dimensions to account for 
their structuring.  
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Beyond this important common feature of tripolarity, the configurations of the six 
party systems present also diverging developments – as a result of the variable contex-
tual conditions. We have not presented any explicit hypotheses concerning these diverg-
ing developments, but we can indicate some factors that are likely to account for them. 
For example, some of the emerging differences can be traced to the electoral rules and 
to the overall institutional framework. Thus, it is not surprising to observe that new par-
ties, on the left or on the right, have been more successful in countries with proportional 
elections. Britain, one of the prime examples of a majoritarian democracy, has not seen 
the emergence of any significant green or right-wing populist party. While France is 
also a majoritarian democracy, the populist right and other possible outsiders play an 
important role in presidential campaigns. This may be explained by the fact that in the 
first round votes tend to be cast almost as in a PR system. Moreover, regional, local and 
European elections in France follow the rules of PR, which allows a party to become 
important, even if its chances at the national level are limited by a majoritarian system. 
Among the more consensual democracies, new parties on the left and on the radical 
right as well as transformed mainstream parties have had more success. Germany is the 
only case of a rather consensual democracy where no stable new national party has 
emerged on the right of the political spectrum.  
While we acknowledge the impact of the institutional context, we believe that most 
of the emerging country-specific differences are attributable to the strategies which the 
mainstream parties adopt in the face of the challenges linked to the hypothetical new 
structural conflict between losers and winners of the opening up of the national borders, 
and to the characteristics of the new challengers themselves. Contrary to the basic struc-
ture of the space, these strategies are not generally predictable, but depend on the deci-
sions taken by political actors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the related 
differences in detail for each country. Suffice it to observe that the two pairs of strate-
gies which we have theoretically distinguished – convergence vs. polarization and stig-
matization vs. cooperation – have all been applied in various combinations and with 
variable success by some parties in our countries at some point in time. In addition, we 
have also come across an unexpected pattern of reaction – the joint convergence of the 
three Dutch mainstream parties towards the position adopted by the new challenger –, 
which indicates that the distinction between convergence vs. polarization that has domi-
nated the literature does not exhaust the strategic possibilities of established parties 
when they are faced with a new challenger. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Issue positions of Austrian parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. instit. ref. infra 
gr             
1994 0.00 -1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.11  1.00 1.00 -0.14  
1999 0.23 -0.25 1.00 0.47  1.00 -0.60 0.00 -0.60 0.92 1.00 1.00 
2002 0.53 -0.13 0.00 0.53 0.56 0.42 -1.00 -0.81 0.00 1.00 0.00 -0.20 
spö             
1975 0.59 -0.30 -0.40 0.91  0.69   0.81 0.00 0.29 0.90 
1994 0.86 -0.15 0.46 0.65 0.80 0.75 0.66 -0.32 0.87 1.00 0.29 1.00 
1999 0.57 0.26 0.89 0.44 1.00 0.71 -0.25 -0.74 0.50 0.76 0.74 0.73 
2002 0.69 -0.58 0.67 0.48 0.29 0.64 -1.00 -0.93            0.89 0.74 0.82 
lif             
1994 1.00 0.86  0.83 1.00 1.00 0.00 -1.00 1.00  -0.45  
1999 0.09 0.83 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.83  0.57 -1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 
övp             
1975 0.89 -0.37 0.50 0.50  0.14   1.00 1.00 0.37 0.80 
1994 -0.34 0.43 0.88 0.21 0.94 0.26 -0.14 -0.14 0.65 0.00 0.34 1.00 
1999 0.15 -0.04 1.00 -0.51 0.61 0.73  -0.28 1.00 0.47 0.70  
2002 0.14 0.14 0.83 0.34 0.50 0.68 0.38 0.30 0.67 0.73 0.18 0.00 
fpö             
1975 -0.71 -0.17 0.73 -1.00  -1.00   1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 
1994 -0.20 -0.13 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.54  
1999 -0.23 -0.05 0.56 -0.55 -0.13 1.00 0.60 0.38 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 
2002 0.38 -0.50 1.00 -0.83 0.20 -1.00 1.00 0.29 -1.00 1.00 0.35 0.54 
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Table A2:  Issue salience for Austrian parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. 
instit. 
ref. infra N 
% of  
election 
gr               
1994 3.92 1.96 9.80 3.92 1.96 13.73 17.65 0.00 13.73 19.61 13.73 0.00 51 6.31 
1999 15.66 14.46 2.41 22.89 0.00 7.23 6.02 7.23 6.02 14.46 2.41 1.20 83 7.55 
2002 10.76 2.53 1.27 10.76 5.70 8.23 4.43 11.39 1.90 26.58 10.13 6.33 158 15.98 
spö               
1975 12.83 12.54 8.75 6.41  15.16   6.12 4.08 9.91 24.20 343 53.59 
1994 10.45 12.24 7.76 17.61 5.97 7.16 5.67 4.18 15.82 0.60 5.67 6.87 335 41.46 
1999 13.91 16.27 4.72 10.76 1.05 6.30 1.05 9.45 8.40 8.92 13.91 5.25 381 34.64 
2002 25.93 7.04 8.89 8.52 2.59 10.37 1.48 10.00 0.00 14.07 7.04 4.07 270 27.30 
lif               
1994 2.22 31.11 0.00 26.67 4.44 2.22 4.44 2.22 2.22 0.00 24.44 0.00 45 5.57 
1999 23.71 23.71 9.28 5.15 3.09 12.37 0.00 7.22 1.03 3.09 10.31 1.03 97 8.82 
övp               
1975 17.54 22.37 11.40 4.39  20.18   1.75 0.44 15.35 6.58 228 35.63 
1994 17.32 17.65 5.56 12.42 5.56 6.21 2.29 6.86 12.09 0.33 11.44 2.29 306 37.87 
1999 21.82 6.91 5.80 19.61 4.97 11.05 0.00 16.02 2.76 4.14 6.91 0.00 362 32.91 
2002 20.36 8.40 10.43 7.38 10.69 7.12 10.69 7.12 1.53 11.45 4.33 0.51 393 39.74 
fpö               
1975 10.14 17.39 21.74 1.45  7.25   7.25 13.04 15.94 5.80 69 10.78 
1994 14.08 11.27 5.63 2.82 1.41 2.82 8.45 2.82 9.86 2.82 38.03 0.00 71 8.79 
1999 16.95 11.86 5.08 11.30 2.26 5.65 11.86 9.04 6.21 1.69 15.25 2.82 177 16.09 
2002 23.21 8.33 3.57 7.14 13.69 0.60 4.17 12.50 0.60 12.50 5.95 7.74 168 16.99 
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Table A3:  Issue positions of Swiss parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. instit. ref. infra 
gr             
1991 0.83 -0.33 -1.00 0.63 -0.81 1.00 -1.00 -0.73  0.85 0.50 -0.84 
1995            -0.33            0.00 -0.50            -1.00 -1.00  0.65 -0.75 -1.00 
sp             
1975 0.77 -0.71 1.00 0.71  1.00  0.50 -1.00 0.83 0.32  
1991 0.74 -0.20 -0.09 0.69 0.76 -0.20 -0.41 -0.75  0.81 0.11 -0.20 
1995 0.89 0.14 0.20 0.52 0.56 1.00 0.00 -0.15  0.95 -0.55 0.08 
1999 0.83 -0.25  1.00 1.00 0.73 -0.78   0.58 -0.33 0.83 
cvp             
1975 0.88 -0.22 1.00 0.78  1.00  0.25 0.25 1.00 0.41  
1991 0.67 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.55 0.33 -0.14 -0.40  0.62 0.58 0.67 
1995 0.33 0.53 1.00 -0.25 0.33 1.00 -0.33 0.50  0.70 0.46 0.24 
1999 1.00 -0.22 0.56 0.84 1.00 0.94 0.64 -1.00  0.57 -1.00 1.00 
lib             
1975 0.26 0.00 0.78 0.47  0.64  0.50 0.88 -0.11 0.22  
1991 0.47 0.87 0.55 0.37 0.43 -1.00 0.67 0.76  0.74 0.59 0.60 
1995 -0.56 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.44 1.00 0.14 0.75  0.50 0.21 1.00 
1999 0.25 0.85 0.96 0.80 1.00 0.39 0.56 0.00  0.00 0.60 0.91 
svp             
1975 -0.25 -0.40 1.00 0.41  1.00  1.00 1.00 0.63 0.09  
1991 -0.32 0.23 0.71 -0.18 -0.82 -0.50 0.71 0.75  -0.10 0.20 -0.10 
1995 0.19 0.71 0.94 -0.87 -0.86 -0.50 0.83 0.88  0.92 0.46 -0.60 
1999 -0.80 0.79 1.00 -0.26 -0.91 -0.60 0.69 1.00  0.00 0.83 1.00 
rr             
1975 0.27 -1.00 1.00 -0.03  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
1991 -0.50 1.00 0.75 -0.58 -1.00  0.93 0.56  -0.18 1.00 0.33 
1995 -1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.25 -1.00 0.00 0.91 1.00  -1.00 0.60 -0.67 
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Table A4: Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. 
instit. 
ref. infra N 
% of  
election 
gr               
1991 3.35 1.68 1.12 8.94 30.17 2.79 2.79 6.15  18.44 3.35 21.23 179 13.33 
1995 0.00 7.69 0.00 20.51 10.26 0.00 2.56 2.56  43.59 5.13 7.69 39 3.92 
sp               
1975 19.13 12.17 7.83 25.22  3.48  9.57 2.61 5.22 14.78  115 18.91 
1991 13.31 8.06 12.90 18.15 9.27 2.02 6.85 8.87  12.90 3.63 4.03 248 18.47 
1995 20.11 15.22 2.72 17.93 4.89 0.54 1.09 7.07  11.96 11.96 6.52 184 18.49 
1999 13.64 9.09 0.00 10.61 3.03 22.73 13.64 0.00  9.09 9.09 9.09 66 8.96 
cvp               
1975 14.41 8.11 9.01 28.83  5.41  3.60 7.21 3.60 19.82  111 18.26 
1991 10.76 3.98 2.79 19.92 15.54 1.20 8.37 3.98  23.51 5.18 4.78 251 18.69 
1995 9.55 12.10 17.83 10.19 1.91 1.91 3.82 1.27  21.02 8.28 12.10 157 15.78 
1999 7.86 12.86 11.43 17.86 2.86 18.57 5.00 2.86  10.71 2.14 7.86 140 19.00 
lib               
1975 18.58 25.22 7.96 8.41  4.87  7.08 7.52 3.98 16.37  226 37.17 
1991 11.11 12.82 9.40 13.96 11.68 0.28 6.55 4.84  15.10 11.40 2.85 351 26.14 
1995 7.38 24.59 8.61 13.11 11.07 5.33 5.74 3.28  1.64 11.89 7.38 244 24.52 
1999 6.72 21.43 19.33 4.20 2.52 17.23 13.03 0.84  3.36 2.10 9.24 238 32.29 
svp               
1975 8.89 11.11 8.89 24.44  4.44  8.89 12.22 8.89 12.22  90 14.80 
1991 12.50 11.00 3.50 17.00 11.00 2.00 20.50 5.00  12.50 2.50 2.50 200 14.89 
1995 6.19 2.41 12.37 10.65 45.70 0.69 4.12 5.84  2.06 8.25 1.72 291 29.25 
1999 3.41 6.48 22.87 6.48 7.51 8.19 29.01 7.51  2.05 3.07 3.41 293 39.76 
rr               
1975 16.67 4.55 1.52 48.48  6.06  7.58 3.03 3.03 9.09  66 10.86 
1991 1.75 4.39 7.02 16.67 9.65 0.00 23.68 7.02  19.30 5.26 5.26 114 8.49 
1995 6.25 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 1.25 27.50 6.25  3.75 12.50 7.50 80 8.04 
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Table A5:  Issue positions of German parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of  
issues 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. instit. ref. infra 
pds             
1998 0.85 0.06            0.80            1.00            -0.67 -0.33 0.83 0.00 0.50 
gr             
1994 0.86 -0.70 -1.00 0.71  1.00 -1.00 -1.00  1.00 0.75 0.50 
1998 0.58 -0.56 1.00 0.67  0.29 -1.00 0.04 -0.63 0.82  -0.13 
2002 0.33 0.11 0.60 0.72   -1.00  0.00 0.98 1.00 0.00 
spd             
1976 0.27 -0.29 -0.63 0.66  0.80  -0.90 0.21 1.00  0.63 
1994 0.34 -0.93 0.87 0.45 0.21 0.50 -1.00 -0.33 0.64 0.50 1.00 0.76 
1998 0.32 0.00 0.40 0.42  0.83 1.00 0.17 0.83 0.86 0.27 0.79 
2002 0.59 0.22 -0.29 0.40 1.00 0.97 -0.44 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.43 0.78 
fpd             
1976 0.07 0.46 -0.78 0.79  0.56  -0.63 0.00 0.16  -0.71 
1994 0.06 0.68 0.33 0.36 -0.09 0.00 -0.75 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.43  
1998 -0.52 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.00 0.60 -0.56 0.07 0.69 0.00 0.71 0.71 
2002 -0.13 0.57 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.67 0.33  -0.50 -1.00 0.88 0.67 
union             
1976 0.30 0.56 0.40 -0.24  0.33  0.45 0.87   -0.56 
1994 0.20 0.54 0.73 0.17 0.63 0.60 0.85 0.88 0.64 0.76 0.72 0.58 
1998 0.09 0.61 0.59 -0.08 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.97 -0.05 0.40 0.29 
2002 0.43 0.22 0.58 0.15 1.00 0.60 0.64 1.00 0.91 -0.03 0.85 0.25 
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Table A6:  Issue salience for German parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. 
instit. 
ref. infra N 
% of  
election 
pds               
1998 19.70 27.27 0.00 15.15 0.00 3.03 0.00 9.09 4.55 9.09 6.06 6.06 66 5.81 
gr               
1994 13.46 9.62 3.85 13.46 0.00 1.92 3.85 7.69 0.00 23.08 15.38 7.69 52 5.49 
1998 18.90 4.88 1.83 18.29 0.00 4.27 7.93 7.32 9.76 17.07 0.00 9.76 164 14.44 
2002 11.21 8.41 4.67 16.82 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 6.54 42.99 6.54 1.87 107 9.15 
spd               
1976 17.52 13.25 3.42 30.34  4.27  4.27 10.26 0.43  16.24 234 38.36 
1994 18.30 10.27 6.70 17.86 6.25 5.36 1.34 6.70 6.25 9.38 4.02 7.59 224 23.63 
1998 30.56 9.72 3.47 13.54 0.00 4.17 1.39 2.08 15.97 11.11 3.82 4.17 288 25.35 
2002 16.16 16.87 7.99 26.29 1.07 5.33 1.60 3.91 8.17 6.04 2.49 4.09 563 48.16 
fpd               
1976 15.73 26.97 5.06 15.73  9.55  2.25 6.18 10.67  7.87 178 29.18 
1994 13.14 18.25 8.76 20.44 8.03 7.30 5.84 3.65 5.84 3.65 5.11 0.00 137 14.45 
1998 17.78 13.89 6.67 25.00 2.22 2.78 10.00 3.89 7.22 2.78 3.89 3.89 180 15.85 
2002 14.29 18.75 32.14 11.61 0.89 5.36 2.68 0.00 3.57 0.89 7.14 2.68 112 9.58 
union               
1976 16.67 19.70 12.63 31.82  1.52  5.56 7.58 0.00  4.55 198 32.46 
1994 16.07 12.52 7.48 14.21 9.53 1.87 2.43 4.49 10.65 10.47 5.42 4.86 535 56.43 
1998 17.81 5.02 11.42 21.46 0.68 3.88 8.22 1.83 15.30 6.62 3.42 4.34 438 38.56 
2002 20.93 12.66 10.85 14.21 3.36 1.29 9.30 1.29 11.63 9.04 3.36 2.07 387 33.11 
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Table A7:  Issue positions of French parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. security env. instit. ref. 
rl           
1988 1.00 -0.85 -1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
2002 1.00 -1.00 0.25    -1.00 -0.33  0.33 
pcf           
1978 0.94 -0.94 -0.44 0.46  0.82  1.00 -1.00 0.82 
1988 0.91 -1.00 -0.75 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.80 0.20  0.92 
1995 0.75 -0.94 -1.00 0.83 -0.50 1.00 -0.50 1.00  0.57 
2002 1.00 -0.87 0.33 0.60  0.60 -1.00 1.00  -1.00 
psf           
1978 0.71 -0.86 -0.35 0.76  0.46  0.80 1.00 0.58 
1988 0.72 -0.48 0.21 0.98 1.00 1.00 -0.46 0.29  0.49 
1995 0.78 -0.86 -0.10 0.75 0.95 0.94 -0.44 0.71  0.46 
2002 0.63 -0.67 0.34 0.46 1.00 1.00 -1.00 0.92  0.65 
eco           
2002 0.88 -1.00 -0.25 0.43  1.00 -1.00 -0.14  -0.27 
mrg           
1978 0.77 -0.58 0.17 0.20  0.50  1.00 0.67 0.94 
1995 0.56 -1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00  -1.00   1.00 
udf           
1978 0.23 -0.37 0.84 0.07  1.00  0.92 0.61 0.64 
1988 0.16 0.30 0.87 0.82 1.00 0.94 0.78 0.76  0.84 
1995 -0.33 -0.71 1.00 1.00 0.56  1.00 1.00  0.75 
2002 -0.22 -0.28 0.64 0.40  1.00 -1.00 1.00  0.71 
rpr           
1978 -0.05 -0.04 0.85 -0.72  1.00  1.00 0.33 0.04 
1988 0.20 0.32 1.00 0.12 0.91 0.85 0.56 0.72  0.09 
1995 0.24 -0.47 0.60 0.26 0.59 0.90 0.76 1.00  0.45 
2002 0.05 0.21 0.94 0.43 1.00 1.00 -0.85 0.96  0.00 
rr           
1988 -0.05 -0.71 0.88 -0.79 1.00 -0.14 1.00 1.00  0.73 
1995 0.29 0.00 0.75 -0.69 -1.00 -1.00 0.68 1.00  0.64 
2002 -0.11 0.41 1.00 -0.71 -1.00 0.71 0.85 0.80  0.80 
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Table A8:  Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. security env. instit. ref. N 
% of 
election 
rl             
1988 52.08 27.08 2.08 6.25 0.00 4.17 2.08 2.08  4.17 48 2.43 
2002 36.07 34.43 13.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 4.92  9.84 61 5.73 
pcf             
1978 27.66 28.51 11.06 17.45  4.68  0.85 0.43 9.36 235 16.57 
1988 38.18 16.97 4.85 9.09 4.24 7.88 12.12 3.03  3.64 165 8.34 
1995 23.53 30.39 1.96 11.76 3.92 7.84 3.92 2.94  13.73 102 6.05 
2002 43.24 20.27 8.11 6.76 0.00 6.76 8.11 4.05  2.70 74 6.95 
psf             
1978 34.47 24.84 10.25 10.56  4.35  3.11 0.93 11.49 322 22.71 
1988 23.36 19.19 4.16 12.48 8.72 15.44 6.31 3.76  6.58 745 37.66 
1995 28.59 22.94 3.39 6.79 6.30 5.33 5.17 5.49  15.99 619 36.74 
2002 30.23 12.21 12.79 10.47 2.91 7.56 4.36 14.53  4.94 344 32.33 
eco             
2002 20.24 16.67 7.14 8.33 0.00 9.52 3.57 21.43  13.10 84 7.89 
mrg             
1978 26.32 34.21 4.74 7.89  6.32  1.05 3.16 16.32 190 13.40 
1995 23.68 21.05 10.53 15.79 7.89 0.00 15.79 0.00  5.26 38 2.26 
udf             
1978 19.96 23.03 5.48 17.32  5.48  5.70 10.09 12.94 456 32.16 
1988 19.06 18.78 9.39 6.08 8.01 18.51 2.49 9.94  7.73 362 18.30 
1995 8.57 20.00 8.57 11.43 22.86 0.00 2.86 2.86  22.86 35 2.08 
2002 20.69 18.39 12.64 11.49 0.00 4.60 8.05 16.09  8.05 87 8.18 
rpr             
1978 29.30 21.40 9.30 17.21  4.65  6.05 1.40 10.70 215 15.16 
1988 21.05 19.37 3.37 11.16 4.63 8.21 13.26 11.79  7.16 475 24.01 
1995 21.68 20.92 11.35 7.27 10.20 6.51 2.17 4.59  15.31 784 46.53 
2002 19.86 18.05 11.55 7.58 1.08 3.97 4.69 17.69  15.52 277 26.03 
rr             
1988 10.38 3.83 7.10 11.48 2.73 3.83 33.88 14.75  12.02 183 9.25 
1995 13.08 12.15 7.48 16.82 9.35 1.87 23.36 5.61  10.28 107 6.35 
2002 13.14 12.41 6.57 10.22 4.38 5.11 18.98 21.90  7.30 137 12.88 
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Table A9:  Issue positions of Dutch parties in the five campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. instit. ref. infra 
gl             
1972 0.61 -1.00 0.00 1.00  1.00  -1.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1994 0.56 -0.50            0.25            0.00 -1.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 
2002 1.00   -0.50  1.00 -0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.61 
pvda             
1972 0.79 -1.00 -0.15 0.81  1.00  -0.59 -0.45 1.00 1.00 -0.33 
1994 0.33 0.14 0.10 0.33 0.78 0.39 -0.16 0.50 0.04 0.75 0.00 -0.33 
1998 0.74 -0.50 -0.38 0.43 -0.23 0.89 -0.50 -0.50 0.53 1.00 0.33 0.80 
2002 0.29 -0.50 0.57 -0.31 -0.67 0.11 -0.20 -0.35 0.44 0.27 0.14 0.74 
d66             
1972 0.69 -1.00 -1.00 0.63  1.00  -1.00 -1.00 0.20 1.00 0.00 
1994 0.32 1.00 -1.00 0.00  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00  -0.25 
1998 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.66 -0.96 -1.00 -0.04 0.75 0.33 1.00 
2002 0.23   0.07 1.00 0.11 0.00 -0.93 1.00 1.00 0.50  
cd             
1972 0.59 -0.52 -0.07 0.50  0.59  0.00 0.80 0.98 0.57 0.65 
1994 -0.10 0.55 0.75 0.58 -0.17 0.67 0.62  0.36 0.81 -0.60 0.25 
1998 -0.67 0.33  0.19 -0.20 1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2002 0.05 -0.50 -0.05 -0.05 0.38 0.38 -0.44 0.50 0.43 0.04 0.70 0.27 
vvd             
1972 -0.39 0.43 0.64 0.40  0.17  0.06 0.90 1.00 0.58 1.00 
1994 -0.43 1.00 0.43 -0.56 -0.50 -0.38 0.50 1.00 0.64 -0.08 -1.00 -1.00 
1998 -0.33 0.12 0.66 -0.30 -0.06 1.00 0.57 0.90 -0.05 -0.72 1.00 0.07 
2002 -0.11 0.30 0.28 0.00 -0.61 1.00 1.00 0.15 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.45 
lpf             
2002 -0.30 0.33 -0.08 -0.33 -0.67 -0.18 -0.29 0.14 -0.10 -1.00 0.43 -0.57 
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Table A10:  Issue salience for Dutch parties in the five campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture immig. army security env. 
instit. 
ref. infra N 
% of 
election 
gl               
1972 31.82 2.27 4.55 2.27  18.18  18.18 4.55 6.82 6.82 4.55 44 5.63 
1994 19.05 9.52 0.00 9.52 0.00 4.76 9.52 2.38 4.76 26.19 4.76 9.52 42 6.04 
2002 21.05 0.00 0.00 10.53 0.00 7.89 13.16 2.63 5.26 5.26 10.53 23.68 38 2.90 
pvda               
1972 25.49 2.94 12.75 7.84  12.75  15.69 10.78 2.94 5.88 2.94 102 13.06 
1994 18.61 3.03 4.33 6.49 3.90 19.48 10.82 2.60 15.58 9.52 4.33 1.30 231 33.24 
1998 13.29 8.39 11.19 9.79 7.69 9.79 5.59 5.59 13.99 5.59 2.10 6.99 143 29.07 
2002 9.48 6.21 2.29 7.84 0.98 2.94 7.52 39.87 5.88 7.19 2.29 7.52 306 23.36 
d66               
1972 36.73 2.04 4.08 8.16  12.24  10.20 2.04 10.20 10.20 4.08 49 6.27 
1994 25.58 2.33 2.33 9.30 0.00 4.65 9.30 4.65 18.60 9.30 0.00 13.95 43 6.19 
1998 16.00 4.67 0.67 24.00 2.67 10.67 8.67 2.00 18.67 5.33 6.00 0.67 150 30.49 
2002 15.96 0.00 0.00 28.72 1.06 9.57 2.13 23.40 4.26 2.13 12.77 0.00 94 7.18 
cd               
1972 26.86 8.78 7.18 11.97  10.37  4.52 6.65 6.65 11.70 5.32 376 48.14 
1994 28.82 7.64 7.64 10.42 7.29 2.08 5.90 0.00 18.40 7.29 1.74 2.78 288 41.44 
1998 15.79 7.89 0.00 21.05 13.16 2.63 2.63 5.26 23.68 2.63 2.63 2.63 38 7.72 
2002 17.50 3.33 7.92 17.92 3.33 5.00 3.33 4.58 18.75 9.58 4.17 4.58 240 18.32 
vvd               
1972 25.24 6.67 11.90 11.43  5.71  15.24 9.52 2.86 9.05 2.38 210 26.89 
1994 7.69 5.49 7.69 9.89 8.79 4.40 32.97 2.20 12.09 6.59 1.10 1.10 91 13.09 
1998 13.04 10.56 9.94 6.21 21.12 1.24 8.70 3.11 6.21 5.59 0.62 13.66 161 32.72 
2002 13.06 7.56 3.09 11.68 4.81 1.37 2.06 8.93 25.09 6.19 12.37 3.78 291 22.21 
lpf               
2002 13.49 2.64 3.81 16.13 3.52 3.23 7.62 4.11 17.89 1.47 10.56 15.54 341 26.03 
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Table A11:  Issue positions of British parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture security env. instit. ref. infra 
lab           
1974 0.92 -0.28 0.23 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.67 -1.00 1.00 0.82 
1992 0.48 -0.88 -0.53 -0.35 0.33 0.56 -0.33 1.00 -0.07  
1997 0.41 -0.10 0.29 0.10 -0.50 0.68 0.86 0.81 0.21 0.70 
2001 0.60 -0.01 -0.03 0.67 0.37 0.55 0.86 0.48 0.70 0.05 
libdem           
1974 1.00 -0.27 -1.00            -1.00                       -1.00 1.00 1.00 
1992 1.00 0.60 -0.80 1.00            0.80            1.00 0.79            
1997 0.03 -0.73 -1.00 0.80 0.89 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.54 0.78 
2001 1.00 0.60            -1.00            1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00            
cons           
1974 0.90 0.09 0.33 -0.16 -0.50 -0.05 0.38 -0.77 0.60 0.86 
1992 0.60 0.35 0.48 -0.22 -0.20 0.61 1.00 0.47 -0.75 1.00 
1997 0.11 0.48 0.25 -0.21 -0.79 0.43 0.93 1.00 0.24 0.42 
2001 0.30 0.23 0.46 0.23 -0.79 0.00 1.00 -0.71 -0.20  
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Table A12:  Issue salience for British parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 welfare eco lib. budget cult. lib. europe culture security env. 
instit. 
ref. infra N 
% of  
election 
lab             
1974 15.03 38.73 7.51 2.89 11.56 3.47 3.47 2.31 8.67 6.36 173 32.28 
1992 29.02 21.88 7.14 7.59 1.34 18.30 1.34 1.34 12.05 0.00 224 37.40 
1997 10.52 18.82 5.72 11.07 11.99 10.33 15.68 4.80 7.38 3.69 542 44.35 
2001 13.04 20.37 3.43 4.81 13.50 7.09 13.27 7.09 12.81 4.58 437 69.48 
libdem             
1974 24.32 29.73 13.51 0.00 2.70 0.00 0.00 2.70 24.32 2.70 37 6.90 
1992 8.16 10.20 20.41 12.24 0.00 10.20 0.00 4.08 34.69 0.00 49 8.18 
1997 12.20 9.15 3.05 16.46 5.49 6.10 9.15 20.73 7.93 9.76 164 13.42 
2001 30.00 25.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 25.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 20 3.18 
cons             
1974 7.98 33.44 2.76 11.66 3.68 5.83 8.90 9.20 3.07 13.50 326 60.82 
1992 14.11 15.95 14.72 11.35 3.07 14.11 9.82 4.60 9.82 2.45 326 54.42 
1997 15.50 11.24 2.33 11.05 18.41 7.75 15.89 5.23 5.62 6.98 516 42.23 
2001 13.37 7.56 8.14 7.56 29.07 11.63 9.88 4.07 8.72 0.00 172 27.34 
 
